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Abstract
Selten and Chmura (American Economic Review, June 2008, 98(3), 938-966) re-
cently reported experimental laboratory results for 2 × 2 games with unique mixed-
strategy equilibria used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary con-
cepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling
equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. They conclude that impulse balance
equilibrium performs best, and, in particular, significantly outperforms quantal re-
sponse equilibrium. We reanalyze their data and correct some errors. The reanalysis
shows that Nash clearly fits worst but the four other concepts perform about equally
well. It is surprising that four models, which are so conceptually different, are so
close in accuracy, and following Selten and Chmura’s suggestion, we report new anal-
ysis of previous experiments on 2 × 2 games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria.
These additional tests show the importance of the loss aversion that is hardwired
into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash stationary concepts are
augmented with loss aversion they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
A recent paper by Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) (henceforth SC) reports
laboratory results for 12 different 2 × 2 games with a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium.
These binary-choice games are relatively simple and provide a natural testbed for alternative
models that aim to predict long-run, or stationary, outcomes of play. SC consider five
such models: Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium,
payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium subsumes that player have correct beliefs about others’ play and that
players best respond to those beliefs. Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) replaces the
requirement of best responses with “better responses,” i.e. players are more likely to choose
the option with the higher expected payoff but they don’t necessarily choose the best option
all the time. QRE does assume that players’ beliefs are correct on average, i.e. beliefs are
not systematically biased. Action sampling equilibrium describes the long-run outcome
when players best respond to a finite sample of their opponent’s previous actions.1 Payoff
sampling equilibrium describes the long-run outcome when players form two finite samples
of their past payoffs, one for each option, and select the one with the highest total payoff.
Finally, impulse balance equilibrium is based on the idea that players take into account
foregone payoffs. If the option not chosen would have yielded higher payoffs, then there is
an “impulse” to change (and, importantly, ‘losses’ of foregone payoff are weighted twice as
heavily as gains). Impulse balance equilibrium corresponds to the long run outcome where,
for both players, expected impulses are equal across the two options.
SC conclude that Nash and QRE fit worse than the other three concepts. They write:
It is remarkable that the newer concepts of impulse balance equilibrium, payoff
sampling equilibrium, and action-sampling equilibrium clearly outperform the
more established concepts of quantal response equilibrium [QRE] and Nash
equilibrium. All the relevant comparisons are highly significant. This is perhaps
the most important result of the statistical tests. (p. 962)
1Action sampling equilibrium is closely related to the “stochastic learning equilibrium” concept intro-
duced by Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt (2002) where players make a noisy best response to a
weighted average of their opponents’ past decisions. Rather than putting a weight of 1 on a fixed number
of past observations and a weight of 0 on observations that are in the more distant past, as in action
sampling equilibrium, the stochastic learning equilibrium assumes that weights decline continuously for
more distant observations (e.g. geometrically). Stochastic learning equilibrium has been shown to yield an
improved fit over QRE in some contexts (see, e.g., C. Monica Capra, Goeree, Rosario Gomez, and Holt,
2002).
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The first point of this comment is that the model fits for two of the five concepts –
QRE and action-sampling – are incorrect for all 12 games.2 We report the correct results
for these two models (and some other small corrections). The corrected fits for QRE are
close to the other three non-Nash concepts, which overturns the most novel (and to some,
surprising) part of their conclusion – viz., QRE fits as well as the other concepts, not worse
(as SC concluded).3
Fit measures and statistical tests show that the four non-Nash models are about equally
accurate. SC note this fact (but for three models, not all four) and suggest a research
direction as follows:
It is not easy to understand why the predictions of the three newer concepts
are not very far apart, in spite of the fact that they are based on very different
principles. This is perhaps peculiar to our sample. It would be desirable to devise
experiments that permit a better discrimination among the three concepts. (p.
965, emphasis ours).
The second point of the comment is to extend the scope of their comparative analysis,
by showing how two different games reported several years ago do “permit a better dis-
crimination” among some of the concepts. The first game was explicitly designed to show
that no quantal response equilibrium (logit or otherwise) could explain observed behavior
(see Game 4 and Proposition 1 in Goeree, Holt, and Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003). Applying
impulse balance equilibrium to this game works like ‘magic:’ it explains observed behavior
almost perfectly. So this game is capable of differentiating between two of the concepts –
impulse balance equilibrium and risk-neutral QRE – that fit equally well in SC’s data.4
The results also highlight one of the crucial assumptions underlying impulse balance
equilibrium: impulses are defined relative to a security level (the max-min payoff) and it
is assumed that losses with respect to this security level are weighed twice as much as
gains. While impulse balance equilibrium is ostensibly a parameter-free concept (since the
loss aversion coefficient is fixed to 2), this additional assumption about players’ different
2A referee also asked us to correct a typo on page 945 of the SC paper in paragraph 4; ”row R” should
be ”column R”.
3It is true that with the corrected analysis, Nash predictions do fit worse than the other four concepts.
However, the ability of other models to explain deviations from Nash play has been shown in many previous
experiments, see Colin F. Camerer (2003) for a book-length summary. This part of their conclusion is solid
but is only original in its emphasis on the sampling and impulse balance models.
4Indeed, impulse balance equilibrium (with loss aversion) outperforms all other stationary concepts
(without loss aversion). Once the other stationary concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they perform
better than impulse balance equilibrium (see Figure 6 below).
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reactions to foregone losses and gains is not innocuous. For the game designed by Goeree
et al., it is the assumption of loss aversion that makes impulse balance equilibrium predict
well.5 As we show below, if the other concepts are augmented with loss aversion they
predict behavior quite well (and even better than impulse balance equilibrium).
The second class of games that discriminate among concepts are asymmetric 2 × 2
matching pennies games (e.g. Jack Ochs, 1995). We report new analyses using the data of
Richard D. McKelvey, Palfrey, and Roberto A. Weber (2000). In these games, loss aversion
plays no role since security levels are 0 and payoffs are non-negative. We find that impulse
balance equilibrium fits the same as QRE and somewhat worse than action-sampling and
payoff-sampling. These two re-analyses of older data take up the search for games that
discriminate better among stationary concepts that SC called for, and show that the loss-
aversion built into impulse balance equilibrium accounts for some of that concept’s success.
2. Re-Examining the SC Results
Table 1 shows data averages and model predictions for each of the 12 games. This table,
and all subsequent tables and figures report corrections of their results in a visual form
identical to their originals. The bold numbers indicate discrepancies between our results
and those of SC. In particular, we find (i) a different impulse balance prediction for Game
1, (ii) a different data average for Game 3, (iii) a different optimal sample size (n = 12)
and, hence, different predictions for action-sampling equilibrium (see Figure 1 for the mean-
squared distances by sample size), and (iv) vastly different predictions for the QRE model:
the precision parameter we estimate using the mean-squared distance objective function is
λ = 1.05, much lower than the estimate reported by SC (λ = 8.84).6
At this lower value of λ, the QRE predictions (see Table 1) are much different from
Nash predictions and much closer to the data. The improved fit is illustrated by Figure
2, which shows data averages and model predictions and parallels Figure 8 in SC. Using
an ‘ocular metric’ suggests that the predictions of the alternative models are remarkably
close to each other and to the data averages. To quantify this we also computed the sample
variance and theory-specific variance as in SC, which are shown in Figure 3 (cf. Figure 12
5Following Ockenfels and Selten (2005), we estimated a one-parameter extension of impulse balance
equilibrium where the weight for gains is fixed to be 1 but the weight for losses is a free parameter, γ. The
estimations yield γ = 2.07 and the improvement in loglikelihood when γ is fixed at 2 is only 0.6%. In other
words, the degree of loss aversion (γ = 2) that is hardwired into the impulse balance equilibrium concept
is nearly optimal for the data set considered.
6Using maximum-likelihood techniques yields an estimate λ = 0.99.
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Table 1 – Five Stationary Concepts Together with the Observed Relative Frequencies for 
Each of the Experimental Games. 
    Nash 
QRE 
(λ=1.05) 
Action-
sampling 
(n=12) 
Payoff-
sampling 
(n=6) 
Impulse 
Balance 
Observed 
average of 12 
observations 
Game 1 U 0.091 0.042 0.090 0.071 0.068 0.079 
 L 0.909 0.637 0.705 0.643 0.580 0.690 
Game 2 U 0.182 0.154 0.193 0.185 0.172 0.217 
 L 0.727 0.579 0.584 0.569 0.491 0.527 
Game 3 U 0.273 0.168 0.208 0.152 0.161 0.163 
 L 0.909 0.770 0.774 0.771 0.765 0.793 
Game 4 U 0.364 0.275 0.302 0.285 0.259 0.286 
 L 0.818 0.734 0.719 0.726 0.710 0.736 
Game 5 U 0.364 0.307 0.329 0.307 0.297 0.327 
 L 0.727 0.657 0.643 0.654 0.628 0.664 
Game 6 U 0.455 0.417 0.426 0.427 0.400 0.445 
 L 0.636 0.607 0.596 0.597 0.600 0.596 
    Nash 
QRE 
(λ=1.05) 
Action-
sampling 
(n=12) 
Payoff-
sampling 
(n=6) 
Impulse 
Balance 
Observed 
average of 6 
observations 
Game 7 U 0.091 0.042 0.090 0.060 0.104 0.141 
 L 0.909 0.637 0.705 0.691 0.634 0.564 
Game 8 U 0.182 0.154 0.193 0.222 0.258 0.250 
 L 0.727 0.579 0.584 0.602 0.561 0.587 
Game 9 U 0.273 0.168 0.208 0.154 0.188 0.254 
 L 0.909 0.770 0.774 0.767 0.764 0.827 
Game 10 U 0.364 0.275 0.302 0.308 0.304 0.366 
 L 0.818 0.734 0.719 0.730 0.724 0.700 
Game 11 U 0.364 0.307 0.329 0.338 0.354 0.331 
 L 0.727 0.657 0.643 0.650 0.646 0.652 
Game 12 U 0.455 0.417 0.426 0.404 0.466 0.439 
 L 0.636 0.607 0.596 0.599 0.604 0.604 
 
Note: 
 
 is logit precision parameter, n is the optimal sampling size for action or payoff sampling. 
 
 
in SC).
SC evaluate the stationary concepts using data from both the first 100 periods and final
100 periods (as in their Figure 13). Our correction to their Figure 13 is Figure 4, which
displays the theory-specific variances for the different concepts (excluding Nash) by the first
and last blocks of 100 periods and for all 200 periods (correcting their Figure 12). It is
notable that all the models fit substantially better in the last block than in the first block,
as one would hope for reasonable concepts of stationary behavior (which are not necessarily
designed to explain early behavior). It is also the case that impulse balance equilibrium
is the best model in the first block of 100 periods, the worst in the second block of 100
periods, and is best using all periods.7 It is an interesting question how model accuracy in
7This conclusion is different from what is concluded from SC’s Figure 13, because of the corrections to
both QRE and action-sampling, which improve their fit especially in the last block of 100 periods.
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Figure 1. Overall Mean Squared Distances for the Action-Sampling
Equilibria with Different Sample Sizes (cf. SC Figure 9).
early, late, and all periods should be used to judge how well a stationary concept explains
behavior.
To test for significant differences, SC report ten pairwise comparisons of the five different
models based on the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test. Each model generates a
squared deviation (between observed and predicted frequencies) for each session, and the
Wilcoxon test is applied to the differences in these squared deviations across models. Table
2 is an updated version correcting SC’s pairwise model comparisons (see their Table 3). The
model with the lowest rank-sum mean squared deviation is in the top row and the model
with the highest rank-sum mean squared deviation is in the bottom row. The entries
display rounded p-values for two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests for pairs
of models, reported separately for constant-sum games, non-constant-sum games, and for
all games (exactly as in their Table 3).8 Combined, the various statistical tests confirm the
general ‘no difference’ result suggested by Figure 2 – there is no clear ranking among the
four stationary concepts that holds in all classes of games. However, all non-Nash models do
much better than Nash and it is perhaps notable that action-sampling and payoff-sampling
do better than QRE when all games are combined.
8The two entries below the diagonal in the impulse-balance row indicate that impulse balance equilibrium
does significantly better than payoff sampling and logit-QRE for the non-constant sum games, but does
worse overall (and significantly worse for the constant sum games).
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Observed Average in the Constant Sum Games (cf. SC Figure 8).
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As noted by a referee, the Wilcoxon test makes some distributional assumptions about
the differences in squared deviations that are not necessarily true for the SC data. There-
fore, we also performed two other non-parametric tests that relax these assumptions: the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test (KS) and a robust rank-order test (Fligner and Po-
licello, 1982). When the KS test is applied to the ten different pairs of models, the null
hypothesis of identical distributions cannot be rejected except when comparing action sam-
pling and impulse balance equilibrium (at the 5% level) and when comparing any of the
non-Nash models with Nash. The robust rank-order test also shows that none of the
pairwise comparisons are significant except when comparing Nash to any of the non-Nash
models.
To summarize, the SC design does not differentiate sharply among the stationary con-
cepts they consider. The more robust non-parametric tests show this property most clearly
(there are no general significant differences among non-Nash models). As noted in the In-
troduction, an extension to games which do differentiate well across concepts is therefore of
interest in addressing the central point of the SC paper, which is comparison of stationary
models.
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Table 2 – P-values in Favor of Row Concepts, Two-Tailed Matched-Pairs Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test, n=108 (Rounded to the Next Higher Level Among 0.1 Percent, 0.2 
Percent, 0.5 Percent, 1 Percent, 2 Percent, 5 Percent and 10 Percent).
Action-
sampling 
equilibrium
Payoff-
sampling 
equilibrium
Quantal 
response 
equilibrium
Impulse 
balance 
equilibrium
Nash 
equilibrium
Action-
sampling 
equilibrium
n.s. 2 percent n.s. 0.1 percent
n.s. 10 percent 5 percent 0.1 percent
n.s. 10 percent n.s. 0.1 percent
Payoff-
sampling 
equilibrium
5 percent n.s. 0.1 percent
0.1 percent 0.1 percent 0.1 percent
n.s. 0.1 percent
Quantal 
response 
equilibrium
n.s. 0.1 percent
0.1 percent 0.1 percent
1 percent
Impulse balance 
equilibrium
0.1 percent
0.1 percent
5 percent 0.5 percent 0.1 percent
Above: All 108 Experiments; Middle: 72 Constant-Sum Game Experiments; Below: 36 
Non-Constant Sum Game Experiments.
3. Differentiating Stationary Concepts in Other Data Sets
Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2003) designed the game in the left panel of Figure 5 to illustrate
the limitations of QRE in terms of explaining behavior when other factors, such as risk
aversion, are likely to play a role. In particular, both players have a “safe” choice that
rewards either 160 or 200 and a “risky” choice that rewards either 10 or 370. Goeree
et al. (2003) prove that in any quantal response equilibrium (logit or otherwise), the
column player’s probability of playing Right is greater than 0.5. Risk aversion, however,
will naturally steer players towards the safer option of playing Left.
In the experiment, the aggregate choice frequencies were 65% for Left and 47% for Up,
which contradicts risk-neutral QRE predictions. To compute the impulse-balance equi-
librium of the game, note that the max-min payoff is 160 for both players. Subtracting
160 from all payoffs and multiplying by 2 if the resulting number is negative, yields the
transformed game in the right panel of Figure 5. The condition that, for both players,
the expected impulses even out yields: 300 pD qR = 170 pU qL and 300 pU qR = 170 pD qL,
which implies that pU =
1
2
and qL =
30
47
≈ 0.64. Impulse balance equilibrium fits almost
perfectly!
Keep in mind that in impulse balance equilibrium the response to perceived losses (rel-
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Left Right Left Right
Up 200, 160 160, 10 Up 40, 0 0, -300
Down 370, 200 10, 370 Down 210, 40 -300, 210
Figure 5. A Matching Pennies Game with “Safe” (200/160)
and “Risky” (370/10) choices (Left) and the Transformed Game (Right).
ative to the max-min reference point) is twice as large as the response to gains. The
authors are very clear that this asymmetry is a fixed feature of the theory, although in
principle it could be treated as a free parameter (as, e.g., Ockenfels and Selten, 2005,
did). Indeed, if losses and gains were weighed equally, the relevant conditions would
be: 150 pD qR = 170 pU qL and 150 pU qR = 170 pD qL, which implies that pU =
1
2
and
qL =
15
32
≈ 0.47. In other words, without the crucial loss aversion feature, the impulse
balance equilibrium predictions are on the wrong side of 0.5 just like the risk-neutral QRE
predictions reported by Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2003). The rightmost bars in Figure
6 show the theory-specific mean-squared deviations for impulse balance, with and without
loss aversion. The other pairs of bars display the analogous results for Nash and non-Nash
models – the latter do better than impulse balance equilibrium once they are also aug-
mented with loss aversion (weighing losses twice as much as gains). Clearly, it is the loss
aversion assumption that drives the goodness of fit for this game across all theories. It
is true that only impulse balance equilibrium has loss aversion hardwired into it (Selten,
Abbink, and Cox, 2005), but Figure 6 shows that adding loss aversion to the other theories
(using the fixed value of two for the loss aversion parameter) improves fit dramatically.
3.1. Asymmetric Matching Pennies Games
A second test of the stationary concepts is provided by the experiments of McKelvey,
Palfrey, and Weber (2000). They used games with an “asymmetric matching pennies”
structure (Ochs, 1995), shown in Figure 7. The Row player earns a positive amount if the
players match on “Heads” or “Tails” (and then the Column player earns nothing), or the
Column player earns a positive amount if the players mismatch (and then the Row player
earns nothing). McKelvey et al. (2000) consider four related games: in game A, X = 9;
in game D, X = 4; game B payoffs are the same as game A’s except Column payoffs are
multiplied by 4; game C payoffs are the same as game A’s except all payoffs are multiplied
by 4.
To compute the impulse balance equilibria for these games note that the max-min payoff
is 0 for both players (as is the second-lowest payoff) so the transformed games are equivalent
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1Figure 6. Theory-specific mean-squared distances for Game 4 from Goeree et al.
(2003) for models with and without loss aversion.
to the original games. A simple calculation shows that for the game in Figure 6, the impulse
balance equilibrium predictions for the Row and Column players are9
pH =
√
X
1 +
√
X
, qH =
1
1 +
√
X
. (1)
Since multiplicative factors drop out of the impulse balance equilibrium calculations, the
predictions for games A, B, and C are identical: pH = 0.75 for Row and qH = 0.25 for
Column, while for game D we have pH = 0.67 for Row and qH = 0.33 for Column.
The aggregate choice frequencies observed in the experiments are shown in Table 3
together with the predictions of the five stationary concepts (estimating any free parameters
across all four games, with best-fitting parameters shown at the top of Table 3). The
rightmost column reports the number of sessions of each game.10 Wilcoxon signed-rank
9Interestingly, the predictions in (1) are identical to those obtained from a “Luce”-type quantal response
equilibrium where choice probabilities are proportional to expected payoffs, e.g.
pH =
piRH
piRH + pi
R
T
, qH =
piCH
piCH + pi
C
T
.
The expected payoffs on the right side depend on the choice probabilities: piRH = qHX, pi
R
T = 1 − qH and
piCH = 1− pH , piCT = pH . It is straightforward to show the fixed-point probabilities are those in (1).
10In the McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (2000) experiments, subjects played 50 periods using one of their
11
Heads Tails
Heads X, 0 0, 1
Tails 0, 1 1, 0
Figure 7. An Asymmetric Matching Pennies Game.
tests across McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber’s sessions indicate that all non-Nash models are
significantly more accurate than Nash, the action-sampling and payoff-sampling models are
more accurate than QRE and impulse balance equilibrium, and the latter two are equally
accurate.11
4. Conclusion
This comment corrects and re-examines some of the results reported by SC. Correcting for
errors in estimating two of the five stationary concepts they consider, QRE and action-
sampling equilibrium, it appears that their design does not differentiate among the non-
Nash stationary concepts that were considered. They also suggest it is desirable to create
games which discriminate among these non-Nash theories, a direction which we pursue by
reporting two new analyses. We first tested these concepts further by using data from
previous laboratory experiments on a game constructed to show that QRE can predict
poorly. Applying all five stationary concepts to those data, with and without loss-aversion,
shows that the loss-aversion that is a fixed feature of impulse balance equilibrium is crucial
for its explanatory power in this particular game. This result extends our understanding
of which modeling features of various theories are responsible for accurate fit. We also
tested the stationary concepts on four variants of matching pennies games. In these games,
all theories fit much better than Nash but action-sampling and payoff-sampling fit a little
better than the other non-Nash theories.
The results reported in SC and here on how closely many of these theories approximate
behavior also suggests the possibility that the different approaches might share some similar
hidden features. For some games, impulse balance equilibrium coincides with a specific
quantal response equilibrium model (footnote 9). Furthermore, by varying the sample size
in the action sampling equilibrium from one to infinity, the implied behavior ranges from
game forms and then played another 50 periods using another one of their game forms. In the analysis
reported here, we consider only the first 50 periods of play.
11The models are ranked: payoff-sampling ∼p=0.55 action-sampling Âp=0.02 impulse balance ∼p=0.11 QRE
Âp=0.01 Nash. These comparisons are confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Fligner-Policello tests.
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Table 3 – Five Stationary Concepts Together with the Observed Relative Frequencies for 
Each of the Experimental Games in McKelvey, Palfrey and Weber (2000).
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purely random to Nash behavior in the 2 × 2 games studied here. This is akin to varying
the precision parameter in a QRE model, and as such, the two models trace out different
one-dimensional curves in the two-dimensional unit square corresponding to players’ choice
probabilities. (And payoff sampling yields yet another such curve.) Evaluating theories via a
simple “horse race” is simply asking which of these curves comes closest to the observed data
points. By allowing oneself some degree of freedom in the choice of underlying modeling
assumptions (e.g. the logit specification of QRE) or behavioral assumptions (e.g. the
loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium), such curve-fitting comparisons
become difficult to interpret.
As a result, the value of these models cannot simply be measured by their ability to come
out ahead in a statistical comparison of fit. It is helpful if models are analytically tractable,
fit a wide range of games with comparable parameter values using different fit and prediction
measures, and perhaps are even consistent with non-choice measures (such as eyetracking).
Therefore, it is necessary to continue to search for combinations of parsimonious theoretical
features which predict well across many games and measures.
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